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ABSTRACT
A significant body of research in the data sciences considers unfair
discrimination against social categories such as race or gender
that could occur or be amplified as a result of algorithmic decisions.
Simultaneously, real-world disparities continue to exist, even before
algorithmic decisions are made. In this work, we draw on insights
from the social sciences brought into the realm of causal modeling
and constrained optimization, and develop a novel algorithmic
framework for tackling pre-existing real-world disparities. The
purpose of our framework, which we call the “impact remediation
framework,” is to measure real-world disparities and discover the
optimal intervention policies that could help improve equity or
access to opportunity for those who are underserved with respect
to an outcome of interest.
We develop a disaggregated approach to tackling pre-existing
disparities that relaxes the typical set of assumptions required for
the use of social categories in structural causal models. Our ap-
proach flexibly incorporates counterfactuals and is compatible with
various ontological assumptions about the nature of social cate-
gories. We demonstrate impact remediation with a hypothetical
case study and compare our disaggregated approach to an existing
state-of-the-art approach, comparing its structure and resulting
policy recommendations. In contrast to most work on optimal pol-
icy learning, we explore disparity reduction itself as an objective,
explicitly focusing the power of algorithms on reducing inequality.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Causal reasoning and diag-
nostics; Machine learning; • Applied computing → Sociol-
ogy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Researchers have worked over the past several years to document
and study how automated decision systems can systematically cre-
ate and amplify unfair outcomes for individuals and groups. Recent
work by Kusner et al. [23] has framed two complementary aspects
of reducing unfair discrimination in algorithms: (1) the discrim-
inatory prediction problem, where we aim to define and reduce
discrimination in model predictions; and (2) the discriminatory im-
pact problem, where we aim to define and reduce discrimination
arising from the real-world impact of decisions. In both of these
contexts, we are concerned with defining and mitigating unfair
discrimination that could occur or be amplified as a result of an
algorithm-assisted decision. Here, we introduce a third domain—
one in which we still care about the potential biases of our model,
but rather than focusing primarily on unfairness emerging from
our model, we focus our modeling attention on disparity that al-
ready exists in the world and is directly measured. Building on the
discriminatory impact problem, we call this problem impact re-
mediation, because the objective of our modeling process is to
remediate an already-observed disparity via an intervention.
In more concrete terms, we define impact remediation as follows.
(1) We observe that there is an existing disparity between different
groups of people with respect to an outcome in the world. The
outcome in question is desirable, and we consider this group-level
disparity to be unfair. (2) We have the ability to perform an in-
tervention that decreases disparity between groups by improving
outcomes for the disadvantaged groups. (3) Interventions occur
over groups of individuals, that is, a single intervention affects
multiple individuals — a fixed set of individuals — depending on lo-
cation or access with respect to the intervention. However, the sets
on which we can intervene may constitute a different partitioning
of people than the groups across which we observe disparity.
There are several potential examples of impact remediation de-
pending on the outcome in question, e.g., people’s access to edu-
cation, voting, jobs, credit, housing, or vaccines. Oftentimes, we
observe disparity across different groups of a social category such
as race or gender. For a concrete example, let’s imagine that we are
a hiring committee, and we observe a gender imbalance in our job
applicant pool. Assume we know that each group wants to apply
at roughly the same rate, so the problem is access not interest. We
thus want to increase access to our applicant pool across gender
groups via outreach. Say we have an intervention we can perform:
we can choose where and how we host booths at career fairs. Here
our impact of interest could be the application rates for each gender
group at each of the possible career fairs. The disparity we want
to remediate is the observed imbalance in application rates. How
should we define disparity? Which career fairs should we target
to get the best results? What resources would we need to spend in
order to sufficiently improve access? In broad terms, these are the
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questions that our framework for impact remediation tackles via
causal modeling and optimization. While these questions are not
new, the novelty of the impact remediation problem is in formaliz-
ing how we can address these questions (1) with relaxed modeling
assumptions about the nature of social categories; (2) in a multi-
level fashion, where the groups of people on which we can intervene
(e.g., career fair attendees) are not necessarily the groups across
which we observe disparate outcomes (e.g., applicants by gender);
and (3) while building on recent work that supports interference
between interventional units during constrained optimization with
causal models.
The impact remediation problem is directly tied to causal model-
ing because causal models systematize the study of interventions we
may wish to perform. In recent years, causal modeling has emerged
as a potential modeling tool for several questions of interest in
algorithmic fairness and transparency, from defining fairness crite-
ria to explaining classifications [5, 19, 22, 24, 38]. These questions
often involve social categories such as race and gender. With no
universally agreed-upon specification of how social categories are
lived and made real through experiences and discrimination, defin-
ing coherent counterfactuals with respect to indicators of social
categories can be a significant challenge [16, 20]. Further, the use of
a social category is never divorced from its history. These two facts
have led to an ongoing debate in the literature on an appropriate
way to use social categories in causal models, and even on whether
they should be used at all.
Our framework relaxes the typical set of required modeling
assumptions to use social categories with causal models, showing
possible compatibility between areas of the literature on causal
inference and social categories that would otherwise seem to be at
odds. The purpose of social categorization in the impact remediation
problem is, by design, to undo the social circumstances that make
such categories relevant when they should not be.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
• We formalize the impact remediation problem using struc-
tural causal models.
• We present a framework for using social categories in
structural causal models that relaxes the typical set of
required modeling assumptions.
• We present a hypothetical case study with real data in
which we qualitatively and quantitatively illustrate the flex-
ibility of our framework and contrast our approach to the
state-of-the-art discriminatory impact problem from Kusner
et al. [23].
2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
The impact remediation problem is aimed at generalizing a broad
range of real-world problems. Consequently, the corresponding
research context is also broad, including areas such as measurement,
sociology, economic policy, causal inference, and optimization. We
first provide some technical background on causal inference before
discussing a few related works.
Causal Models and Interventions. Following Pearl, we use the
structural causal model (SCM) framework. Using notation from
[38], the framework defines an SCM as a 4-tuple (𝑈 , 𝑉 , 𝐹 , 𝑃 (𝑈 )),
where: 𝑈 is a set of exogenous background variables; 𝑉 is a set of
endogenous observed variables, each of which is a descendant of at
least one variable in𝑈 ; 𝐹 is a set of functions (structural equations)
defining, for each𝑉𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 , the process by which it is assigned a value
given the current values of 𝑈 and 𝑉 ; and 𝑃 (𝑈 ) is a distribution
over the exogenous variables 𝑈 . Each SCM has a corresponding
graphical model with 𝑈 ,𝑉 represented as nodes and 𝐹 represented
as directed edges between the associated input/output nodes, from
causal parent to child in a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In short,
the SCM fully specifies the data generating process, with each𝑉𝑖 as
a function of its parents in𝑉 and any incoming exogenous variables.
With notation from [24, 32], we define an intervention on variable𝑉𝑖
as the substitution of equation𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 (𝑉 ,𝑈 ) with a particular value
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑣 , simulating the forced setting of 𝑉𝑖 to 𝑣 by an external agent.
For brevity, we leave out detail on the estimation of interventions
and counterfactuals using the SCM framework and refer the reader
to [31, 32] for an overview.
Interventions with Interference. Following [2, 23, 30, 34], we con-
sider interference models, which generalize SCMs to allow interven-
tions on one unit 𝑖 to affect another unit 𝑗 . Building directly on
Kusner et al. [23], we also focus only on intention-to-treat interven-
tion effects, where, given a set of interventions {𝑍 (1) , . . . , 𝑍 (𝑚) }
and measured outcomes {𝑌 (1) , . . . , 𝑌 (𝑚) } across𝑚 units, interfer-
ence models allow each outcome 𝑌 (𝑖) to be a function of the entire
set of interventions 𝒛 ≡ [𝑧 (1) , . . . , 𝑧 (𝑚) ]𝑇 rather than a function of
𝑧 (𝑖) only. Note that non-interference is still included as a special
case. Recent work such as [7, 39] has also studied interference in
settings like ours, with interventions across sets of individuals and
interconnected units.
Discriminatory Impacts and Fair Optimal Policies. Impact reme-
diation has a similar setup to the discriminatory impact problem
introduced by Kusner et al. [23] and can be seen as an extension of
their framework. However, we diverge from their setting in over-
all purpose as well as setup with respect to protected attributes.
Where their problem is concerned with maximizing overall ben-
eficial impact while estimating causal privilege, ours is instead
aimed at minimizing measured disparity with optional in-group
constraints that need not (but still can) estimate causal privilege.
What may at first seem to be a subtle shift has large methodological
consequences beyond the objective function of our corresponding
optimization problem. One major implication of this shift in focus is
that our framework here does not require using social categories as
causal variables, so the definitions of social categories are separated
from the evaluation of counterfactual statements (see Section 3 for
details and Appendix B for a direct comparison). Despite this sepa-
ration, unfairness with respect to social categories is still a primary
concern we are able to address — such disparities are directly mea-
sured (i.e., factual). Similar related works such as [10, 18, 25, 26, 29]
consider learning optimal fair policies and fairness in decision prob-
lems given real-world impacts, with our work differing in its focus
on disparity rather than fairness, and in its alternate approach to
modeling social categories.
Inequality and Merit. Our approach here also draws on the fram-
ing of algorithmic decision-making presented by Kasy and Abebe
[21], who raise the issue that algorithms concerned with fairness
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Fig. 1. Two debated cases of the use of social categories in causal DAGs ((a) and (b)) compared to two potential DAGs in impact
remediation ((c) and (d)). We use circular arrowheads in DAG notation to denote constitutive rather than causal relationships. (a) In
this DAG, we see that constitutive features are defining features of social categories. Rather than cause each other, they synchronously
define each other, rendering the concept of modular cause-and-e￿ect inapplicable if we choose to include two such variables in a
causal model at the same time. (b) This DAG exemplifies encoding a social category as a variable and modeling it as a cause for an
arbitrary outcome. This model is debated depending on beliefs about whether an intervention on the social category in question can
be modeled and/or is well-defined. (c) In this DAG we have two constitutive features that can synchronously a￿ect or define each
other due to their connection to a social category, again rendering the concept of modular cause-and-e￿ect inapplicable if we choose
to include both in our causal model at the same time. We would not be able to proceed with impact remediation given such a DAG.
(d) This DAG demonstrates that avoiding social categories as variables and using at most one constitutive feature (on which we
believe interventions can be modeled) allows us to avoid constitutive arrows as well as interventions on social categories as causes.
discussed in the context of racial categories. Sen and Wasow [33] outline three issues in the context of causal modeling
with racial categories as potential treatments: (1) an inability to manipulate race; (2) technical issues of post-treatment
bias, common support, and multicollinearity; and (3) fundamental instability in what the construct race means across
treatments, observations, and time. As potential paths forward, Sen and Wasow suggest (a) using exposure to a racial
cue as treatment when looking for evidence of the e￿ects of racial perception on behavior, or (b) measuring the e￿ect
of some manipulable constitutive feature of race in a within-racial-group study when looking for mechanisms behind
disparate outcomes. More recent work by Hanna et al. [12] similarly discusses the multidimensionality of a concept
like race and the limitations for algorithms on conceptualizing and modeling race if a multidimensional perspective is
taken. Other recent work, such as [16, 20], points out that unspeci￿ed assumptions about or oversimpli￿cation of social
categories can lead to incoherent counterfactuals, arguing that perhaps the inherent complexity of social categories
ultimately cannot be reduced in a way that makes them compatible with causal intervention.
Our Approach: Social Categories as Partitions. We take dealing with the above issues for causal modeling with social
categories as inspiration for an alternate modeling framework that avoids the sticking points — including multiple
constitutive features and encoding social categories as causal variables — in the debate outlined above but still addresses
a central and longstanding concern relevant to algorithmic fairness research: pre-existing bias [9, 35]. The underlying
conceptual shift in specifying this framework is a shift in focus away from modeling the e￿ects of demographic attributes
and towards the e￿ects of real-world interventions for each demographic group in a disaggregated manner.
The idea of disaggregation is also often discussed in connection with race (see Hanna et al. [12] for an overview from
the perspective of algorithmic fairness). Disaggregation in the context of social categories can refer to disaggregation of
the social categories themselves (e.g., picking apart the di￿erent dimensions of a category). De￿ning a social category
and specifying its constitutive features could be considered part of this process. Disaggregation can also refer to the
consideration of di￿erent groups of a social category separately rather than interchangeably. Although these two
meanings relate to each other, it is the second use of the term ‘disaggregated’ that we primarily refer to when we
say ‘disaggregated intervention design’ in this work. Inspired by the within-racial-group design proposed by Sen and
Wasow [33], the fact that our outcome is disaggregated across social categories allows us to consider intervention
e￿ects within each category and attempt to re-balance the outcome of interest across categories.
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among those considered of equal ‘merit’ by a decision-maker’s
objective can reinforce rather than question status quo inequali-
ties. They propose alternative perspectives concerned with (1) the
causal impact of decision-making algorithms on inequality and (2)
the distribu ion of power and soc l welfare tha can rationalize
decisions or determine who gets to make them. Questions of in-
equality, social welfare, and optimal decision-making in light of
these quantities are increasingly discussed in computing and al-
gorithmic fairness [1, 13–15, 28] and relate to a vast literature in
economics. Drawing primarily on the perspectives in [21], which ex-
plore the tensions between a decision-maker’s objectives, measures
of fairness, and measures of inequality or social welfare, our focus
here is comple entary: we consider the case where the decision-
maker’s objectives and the measures of inequality or social welfare
are one and the same.
3 REPRESENTING SOCIAL CATEGORIES
When looking at disparities in the real world, it is often the case
that we need to consider social categories. Representing social
categories mathematically, however, can be difficult given how
complex and multi-faceted they can be. This is especially true with
causal modeling, in which we make additional assumptions about
variables and the relatio ships between them in order to model
cause and effect.
Soci l Categories s Variables and Causes. To contextualize our
approach, we find it useful to summarize a few specific method-
ological sources of debate related to the underlying assumptions of
using social categories as treatments in causal modeling. Our dis-
cussion draws on a collection of previous works that wrestle with
t e use of social categories in machine learning and algorithmic
fairness [4, 12, 16, 17, 20, 33]. We refer to a defining attribute of a
social category as a constitutive feature. Constitutive relationships,
to borrow language from Hu and Kohler-Hausmann [16], are syn-
chronous and definitional: instantaneously defining one piece of
what it means to be in a social category; rather than causal and
diachronic: unfolding over time via cause-and-effect. One point of
debate present in discussions of social categories in causal models
surrounds which features in a given problem we consider to be
in constitutive relationships, if any, and how to incorporate such
features n a c usal DAG. If we oose to nclude two features that
we consider instantaneously defining each other in a causal DAG,
there is no way to properly define cause-and-effect with arrows.
Figure 1a illustrates this issue. We use circular arrowheads in DAG
notation to denote constitutive rather than causal relationships.
With two such nodes in a would-be DAG, we end up with an instan-
taneous constitutive cycle. Often the argument is about whether or
not it is fundamentally inaccurate to remove a constitutive cycle
via simplifying as umptions and draw a single arrow one way or
the other. A feature pair that illustrates a potentially constitutive
relationship is racial category paired with socioeconomic history,
d pending on our belief bout he nature of the so ial category
‘race.’ These complex constructs might show up as simplified vari-
ables in our models, but the above issues of synchronicity between
their definitions remain, often turning what may initially seem like
a simple modeling problem into a serious sociological endeavor.
Apart from the case of including constitutive features and social
categories in a DAG at the same time, encoding a social category
as a variable and using it as a cause at all is also a source of debate.
Figure 1b depicts the use of a social category in a DAG as a cause
fo n arbitrary outcome. There are various pi ces of he debat
around this model, often discussed in the context of racial categories.
Sen and Wasow [33] outline three issues in the context of causal
modeling with racial categories as potential treatments: (1) an in-
ability to manipulate race; (2) technical issues of post-treatment
bias, common support, and multicollinearity; and (3) fundamental
instability in what the construct race means across treatments, ob-
servations, and time. As potential paths forward, Sen and Wasow
suggest (a) using exposure to a racial cue as treatment when looking
for evidence of the effects of racial perception on behavior, or (b)
measuring the effect of some manipulable constitutive feature of
r ce in a within-ra ial-group study when looking for mechanisms
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behind disparate outcomes. More recent work by Hanna et al. [12]
similarly discusses the multidimensionality of a concept like race
and the limitations for algorithms on conceptualizing and modeling
race if a multidimensional perspective is taken. Other recent work,
such as [16, 20], points out that unspecified assumptions about
or oversimplification of social categories can lead to incoherent
counterfactuals, arguing that perhaps the inherent complexity of
social categories ultimately cannot be reduced in a way that makes
them compatible with causal intervention.
Our Approach: Social Categories as Partitions. We take dealing
with the above issues for causal modeling with social categories
as inspiration for an alternate modeling framework that avoids
the sticking points — including multiple constitutive features and
encoding social categories as causal variables — in the debate out-
lined above but still addresses a central and longstanding concern
relevant to algorithmic fairness research: pre-existing bias [9, 35].
The underlying conceptual shift in specifying this framework is
a shift in focus away from modeling the effects of demographic
attributes and towards the effects of real-world interventions for
each demographic group in a disaggregated manner.
The idea of disaggregation is also often discussed in connection
with race (see Hanna et al. [12] for an overview from the perspec-
tive of algorithmic fairness). Disaggregation in the context of social
categories can refer to disaggregation of the social categories them-
selves (e.g., picking apart the different dimensions of a category).
Defining a social category and specifying its constitutive features
could be considered part of this process. Disaggregation can also
refer to the consideration of different groups of a social category sep-
arately rather than interchangeably. Although these two meanings
relate to each other, it is the second use of the term ‘disaggregated’
that we primarily refer to when we say ‘disaggregated intervention
design’ in this work. Inspired by the within-racial-group design
proposed by Sen and Wasow [33], the fact that our outcome is disag-
gregated across social categories allows us to consider intervention
effects within each category and attempt to re-balance the outcome
of interest across categories.
Our modeling framework treats social categories mathematically
as partitions over individuals rather than individual attributes. By
virtue of this choice, the required modeling assumption about social
categories in our intervention design is the following: a social cate-
gory consists of a group of people. This group may or may not have
any shared attributes. The categories themselves may be socially
constructed, physically real, subject to change, or have no inher-
ent meaning at all. The categories are only given meaning in our
framework with respect to a measured outcome of interest across
which we observe undesired disparity. Because of the widespread
realities of structural discrimination, social categories such as race
and gender may often be salient for revealing disparity across a
particular outcome of interest. (See Section 4.1 for additional dis-
cussion about operationalizing social categories.) Even with social
categories as partitions, we still have to avoid the issue of including
multiple constitutive features in a causal model simultaneously, as
shown in Figure 1c. Figure 1d demonstrates how our disaggregated
design can avoid constitutive relationships in addition to relaxing
required modeling assumptions about social categories. Note that
if interventions on a constitutive feature are also considered un-
defined, it can instead be treated as a social category. With such
a design, we are able to consider our disparity of interest across
social categories as we employ causal models to look for optimal
interventions.
4 IMPACT REMEDIATION
The impact remediation problem includes measuring an existing
disparity, defining potential interventions, and then finding the
optimal set of units on which to perform an intervention. We first
describe the measurement step before introducing notation for
measured quantities.
4.1 Measurement and Intervention
Formulation
As outlined in Jacobs and Wallach [17], measurement itself is a
modeling process, a key part of which is the operationalization of
constructs of interest as variables that can conceivably be measured.
Operationalizing Categories of People. In the measurement step,
we may operationalize a social category. Notably, measurement
can be used to obscure just as it can be used to reveal. As an exam-
ple, if we put out a survey in which we operationalized race as a
closed-ended self-classification [12], disparities we may or may not
discover would depend on what categories we choose to include
in the list. As another example, were we to operationalize gender
as strictly binary, we may fail to measure outcomes for anyone
who identifies in a non-binary way. For a given outcome, if we are
thinking about intersectionality, we could choose to look at the
Cartesian product of different categories.
We emphasize that splitting outcomes across social category
lines is context-dependent and not always necessary in the first
place. Moreover, measurement of disparate outcomes here is not lim-
ited to traditional social categories. Depending on the application
and the data we have, we could choose to partition people into social
groups using other quantities, for example location, neighborhood,
or even the outcome itself. A social partition based on the outcome
itself could in some cases allow us to focus more exclusively on
the mechanisms of an inequality, and is compatible with our frame-
work. We highlight social categories such as race and gender in our
presentation of this problem because of their relevance in many set-
tings where discrimination has occurred historically. As discussed
in Section 3, the required modeling assumption about social cate-
gories in our framework—including those explicitly discussed—is
only that they consist of groups of people, not necessarily with any
shared attributes.
Identifying Potential Interventions. Alongside measurement of
a disparate outcome, we require domain expertise to study the
mechanisms by which disparity in our outcome of interest has
arisen. Even without comprehensive knowledge of such mecha-
nisms, which can be impossible to have in practical settings, we
can still theorize potential interventions. For example, if a group of
education researchers finds that one reason high school students
have less access to college entrance exams is a shortage of Calculus
teachers (even if that is not the only reason), providing funding
for additional teachers is a potential intervention. That said, the
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Figure 2: An example causal DAG for the impact remedia-
tion problem with two intervention sets 𝑖, 𝑗 and two social
categories 𝑘, 𝑘 ′. Intervention on one intervention set can po-
tentially affect outcomes in the other, demonstrating inter-
ference. For example, 𝑍 (𝑖) = 𝑧 can potentially affect out-











better the intervention disrupts the actual mechanisms leading to
disparity in the first place, the more effective it will be. While we be-
lieve users of this approach will generally be focused on beneficial
interventions, we do not build this constraint into our modeling
assumptions. Since it is possible for a well-intentioned intervention
to be harmful to some individuals or groups, it may be important
that a modeling constraint does not obscure that danger in cases
where the data would otherwise highlight it.
In what follows, we present our proposed disaggregated inter-
vention framework. This framework will allow us to represent and
quantify the effect of a proposed intervention, and to compare
multiple possible interventions.
4.2 Disaggregated Intervention Design
We define our interventional optimization problem with the fol-
lowing notation. We have a set 𝐼 of 𝑛 individuals and a partition
𝜌𝑍 of 𝐼 into𝑚 intervention sets: fixed sets of individuals affected
directly by a single intervention. In other words,
⋃
𝑆𝑖 ∈𝜌𝑍 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐼 ,
|𝜌𝑍 | = 𝑚, and 𝑆𝑖 ∩ 𝑆 𝑗 = ∅ for all 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑆 𝑗 ∈ 𝜌𝑍 , where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . We
also have another partition 𝜌𝐶 of set 𝐼 into 𝑟 sets representing each
value of a social category or intersections (a Cartesian product)
of several social categories. Let 𝑛 (𝑖)
𝑘
represent the number of in-






captures the total number of individuals in social





captures the total number of in-
dividuals in intervention set 𝑖 . We note in passing that these can
be replaced with other weights𝑤 (𝑖)
𝑘
,𝑤𝑘 ,𝑤 (𝑖) , respectively, in spe-
cific contexts where it makes sense to do so. In addition to the
two partitions, we have an (𝑚 × 𝑑) matrix of real-world features
𝑋 for each intervention set, an (𝑚 × 𝑟 ) matrix of impact values
𝑌 measured for each intervention set across the 𝑟 social category
values, and an optional (𝑚 × ℓ) matrix of protected attributes 𝐴 for
each intervention set, where 𝐴 only includes attributes for which
we decide that counterfactuals are well-defined. We have also iden-
tified a potential intervention 𝑍 that can be performed on each of
the𝑚 intervention sets. We assume a causal graph describing how
𝐴,𝑋,𝑌, 𝑍 are related. Figure 2 shows an example causal graph for
the disaggregated design, similar to the discriminatory impact prob-
lem of Kusner et al. [23] but now with the variable 𝑌 disaggregated
across social categories in the causal graph. In each intervention set,
all variables influence outcomes 𝑌 for both of the social categories
𝑘 and 𝑘 ′. In addition, there is interference: intervention on one set
can potentially affect outcomes in the other, for example with 𝑍 (𝑖)











Model Fitting. Our process involves several stages which roughly
correspond to (1) modeling choices, (2) model fitting or estimation,
and (3) optimization of the intervention. Modeling choices include
structural assumptions built into the causal model as well as para-
metric or other functional forms for probability distributions and
for relationships between observed and modeled-unobserved vari-
ables. In the estimation step, we choose an appropriate algorithm
for fitting the assumed model to the observed data, and this algo-
rithm estimates unknown parameters or functions which are then
used as inputs into the final step. The estimation step may involve
optimization, using any of a variety of statistical machine learning
approaches, but in the current work when we speak of optimization
we are referring to the intervention. Note that in this step we are
not only learning a conditional expectation function to predict 𝑌 ,
but a function that also predicts 𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
(𝒛) under interventions 𝒛. Fi-
nally, in the last step we use the fitted model to find an intervention
by optimizing an objective function that reduces disparities.
During estimation and optimization, we must choose which
covariates to include in the conditioning of various expectation
functions. This is a subtle issue with no general solution, and some
argue it requires causal knowledge to answer correctly [31]. We
state simple guiding principles, but stress that these are not univer-
sal rules and that specific applications may justify other choices.
Reasoning backwards from the goal of finding an optimal interven-
tion, we need an accurate model because it influences the optimiza-
tion problem. We could choose to condition on covariates when




(𝒛), for example, to negotiate a favorable trade-off between
bias and variance so that the optimal intervention reduces actual
disparities, and is not influenced by large errors due to a model
that is underfit or overfit. On the other hand, we may not want
our measure of disparity to be conditional on the same set of co-
variates as used in the estimation stage. This could be motivated
by normative assumptions or considerations, for example whether
that covariate is ‘resolving’ of the disparity in the sense of [22]. If
necessary, we may be able to remove conditional covariates in the
optimization step by marginalization. If a covariate 𝑃 measures or
correlates (potentially negatively) with privilege or opportunity,
say—something which is considered a source of unfairness—then
we should consider conditioning on 𝑃 for the purpose of reducing
disparity. We may choose to do this independently of whether it
would improve the model fit in the estimation stage.
It is often easier to observe unfair or undesirable circumstances
than to define fairness at generality. The starting point for impact
remediation is the observation and measurement of an imbalance
in impact 𝑌 that is considered unfair or undesirable. The situation-
specific notion of fairness used within our framework is flexible,
depending on what we consider a ‘fair’ re-balancing of 𝑌 would
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look like relative to the measured distribution. For example, we may
wish to minimize disparity between groups or instead to improve
each group’s outcomes above a minimum threshold. See Appendix
A for details on several of these variations. In short, the impact
remediation framework’s addition of disaggregation to constrained
optimization with causal models is general enough to be compatible
with a variety of problems.
4.3 Example: Outreach in a Job Applicant Pool
Consider 𝑛 university-age students across two universities that
make up a fictitious job applicant pool. Imagine we observe gen-
der imbalance in application rates across these 𝑛 students for gen-
der groups 𝐴 and 𝐵. We wish to re-balance our applicant pool
with respect to gender through outreach to potential job appli-
cants. The intervention we are able to perform is doing targeted
outreach via hosting booths at each university’s career fair. Let











)} be the fraction of students of each
gender at each university who apply for the job, and 𝑍 (𝑖) = 1 if
we host a booth at the career fair of university 𝑖 and 0 otherwise.
Let 𝑛 (𝑖)
𝐴
be the number of students who identify with gender cate-
gory 𝐴 at university 𝑖 and let 𝑛 (𝑖)
𝐵











, counting the total number of
students in each gender group. One possible measure of disparity
in application rates between genders is the following:
𝛿 =










measuring the absolute difference in overall application rates




= 100, 𝑛 (2)
𝐴
= 75, 𝑛 (1)
𝐵
= 150, 𝑛 (2)
𝐵
= 100.
Let the graphical model in the following image represent the
causal relationship between 𝑋,𝑌, 𝑍 .
Observe that we allow interference: imagine, for example, that
these two universities partner to allow their students to attend
either career fair. Given such a graphical model and its structural
equations, we can estimate expected application rates after inter-
vention E[𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
(𝒛)] for university 𝑖 , social group 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, and
set of interventions performed 𝒛 ∈ {0, 1}2. We can replace 𝑌 with
E[𝑌 (𝒛)] in Equation 1, with 𝛿 (𝒛) now denoting the measure of dis-
parity after intervention, a quantity we seek to minimize. Suppose











) = (0.05, 0.10) .
Say we can host at most one career fair booth. With no inter-
vention, 𝛿 ≈ 0.08. From our causal model we obtain estimates of
E[𝑌 (𝒛)] for both possible interventions:
E[𝑌 (1)
𝐴
( [𝑧 (1) = 1, 𝑧 (2) = 0])] = 0.20
E[𝑌 (2)
𝐴
( [𝑧 (1) = 1, 𝑧 (2) = 0])] = 0.10
E[𝑌 (1)
𝐵
( [𝑧 (1) = 1, 𝑧 (2) = 0])] = 0.30
E[𝑌 (2)
𝐵
( [𝑧 (1) = 1, 𝑧 (2) = 0])] = 0.15
E[𝑌 (1)
𝐴
( [𝑧 (1) = 0, 𝑧 (2) = 1])] = 0.15
E[𝑌 (2)
𝐴
( [𝑧 (1) = 0, 𝑧 (2) = 1])] = 0.15
E[𝑌 (1)
𝐵
( [𝑧 (1) = 0, 𝑧 (2) = 1])] = 0.25
E[𝑌 (2)
𝐵
( [𝑧 (1) = 0, 𝑧 (2) = 1])] = 0.15
from which we compute 𝛿 ( [𝑧 (1) = 1, 𝑧 (2) = 0]) ≈ 0.08 and
𝛿 ( [𝑧 (1) = 0, 𝑧 (2) = 1]) = 0.06. Thus, we determine intervention
[𝑧 (1) = 0, 𝑧 (2) = 1] to be the optimal way to do outreach for our
applicant pool, and we host our career fair booth at university 2.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Observe that, in the above example, our focus is on finding the
optimal choice of interventions given a constraint on our budget and
a particular measure of disparity. Alternatively, we could have used
the same framework to compare multiple possible interventions,
or to find the minimum budget that would allow us to achieve a
specified disparity value, or even to compare multiple intervention
decisions under different measures of disparity.
5 CASE STUDY: NYC PUBLIC SCHOOLS
To showcase the practical usefulness of our framework and high-
light the difference in methodological focus compared to that of
Kusner et al. [23], we demonstrate our approach in the same appli-
cation domain as their example: allocating funding to NYC public
schools. For a detailed exposition of this case study with fully de-
fined variables, causal models, and optimization objectives, see
Appendix B. Given space constraints, in this section we only briefly
summarize its main results, namely that our disaggregated inter-
vention design is not only different in structure and required causal
assumptions but can also lead to a completely different set of inter-
ventions and corresponding impact on disparity.
We compare impact remediation (IR), impact remediation with a
no-harm constraint as described in Appendix A (IR + ‘no harm’),
and the discriminatory impact problem (DIP) from [23] with two
values of 𝜏 , one aggressive (𝜏 = 0.567) and the other relaxed (un-
constrained). Table 1 shows our measure of expected disparity for
each set of interventions, the aggregate expected impact across all
students, and the percentage change in expected per-group impact
for each social group we consider, lettered A through G. We see
that, with no intervention at all, the expected disparity measure
is 1.429. Regular IR is able to lower this value the most, to 1.386,
but we observe that this has come at the cost of lower outcome
rates for group G. Including the ‘no harm’ constraint avoids this
issue, leading to even larger increases for groups that previously
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Table 1: Expected disparity, the percentage change in aggregate expected impact across all students, and the percentage change
in expected impact for each social category A-G after performing the interventions recommended by each method.
Approach % Change in Impact Per-group Aggregate DisparityA B C D E F G % Impact (𝜹 (𝒛))
No Intervention ±0.0 ±0.0 ±0.0 ±0.0 ±0.0 ±0.0 ±0.0 ±0.0 1.429
IR +1.76 +0.24 +0.42 +0.10 +0.16 +5.26 –1.35 +0.657 1.386
IR + ‘no harm’ +1.78 +0.54 +0.74 +0.11 +1.02 +5.56 ±0.0 +0.848 1.394
DIP, 𝜏 = 0.567 +1.20 +0.69 +1.46 +0.63 +1.61 +3.50 +0.43 +0.953 1.435
DIP, Unconstrained +1.21 +0.72 +1.48 +0.63 +1.64 +3.51 +0.47 +0.971 1.435
saw gains from regular IR, and we still see a decrease in overall dis-
parity. The last two rows of the table show that, in both instances of
DIP, although the aggregate impact is the highest (which is the ob-
jective of DIP), disparity has increased compared to performing no
interventions, indicating that despite larger gains for many groups,
the groups who would benefit the most are not those that need the
most help. In summary, our proposed framework, IR, with the no
harm option, is in this case most effective at reducing disparities
where it matters most.
6 CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this work, we have formalized the impact remediation problem,
which leverages causal inference and optimization to focus on mod-
eling measured disparities and mitigating them through real-world
interventions. Our framework flexibly allows us to consider the role
of social categories, while relaxing the typical modeling assump-
tions that their use in causal modeling requires. We demonstrated
impact remediation with a real-world case study, and saw how it
can decrease disparity and how it differs from existing approaches
both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The framework is general enough to accommodate a broad range
of problems, and can be used to explore additional questions be-
yond those we have covered here. For example, we know that
each specific case of impact remediation will be different. Having a
framework around these problems could allow us to explore pat-
terns across impact remediation in different settings and/or with
different causal modeling techniques. In the special case without
interference, we can connect to the growing literature on causal
inference for heterogeneous treatment effects and optimal policy
recently reviewed by Athey and Imbens [3]. Understanding poten-
tially heterogeneous treatment effects can help us better understand
why particular units are chosen for intervention, and help policy-
makers decide which policy to adopt.
Another area where the impact remediation framework affords
future exploration is in modeling intersectionality, and considering
in-group fairness with multi-level sensitive attributes that poten-
tially influence each other in unknown ways [8, 27, 36, 37]. Consider,
for example, racial categories and socioeconomic indicators such as
income. For the reasons discussed in Section 3, these two concepts
could simultaneously be incorporated into impact remediation to
make more nuanced policy decisions without requiring specific
causal assumptions on the nature of the relationship between race
and socioeconomic status.
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A MODEL VARIATIONS
In this section, we discuss a variety of objective functions and
constraints that are all compatible with impact remediation. In
the equations below, we consider outcome 𝑌 measured as a rate.
For brevity, we notate expectations without conditioning, but we
emphasize that if conditioning is done during the estimation step,
we would also condition in the optimization step so as to optimize
the same treatment function we estimated. Appendix B shows an
example with conditioning in both steps. In our examples here, we
demonstrate with particular choices for concreteness. In general,
these choices should be made on an application-specific basis which
could incorporate domain knowledge and constraints.
Variations on the Objective Function. If we want the same rate
across sub-populations indexed 𝑘 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑟 }, we might minimize
the expression in Equation 2 to enforce equal sub-population rates











or the expression in Equation 3 to enforce the same sub-population
rates across the entire population,
∑
𝑘≠𝑘′










The assumption in Equations 2 and 3 is that the outcome 𝑌 is
equally desired across groups, so the problem is lack of access.
If we instead believe that disparity between sub-population rates
is okay once each rate is above a minimum threshold ^, we could


































There are other variations as well, such as constraining the max-
imum gap between any two sub-populations, where we hold that a
certain amount of disparity in rates is okay, or using expressions
similar to those above but with different distance norms. In addi-
tion to any parameter thresholds we set, whether or not we can
re-balance𝑌 will depend on what budget we have, the demographic
distributions of the intervention sets, and the relative effectiveness
of the intervention for each sub-population. Given these trade-offs,
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the impact remediation framework can be used to find optimal in-
tervention sets with a fixed budget or to find the necessary budget
given desired disparity thresholds: notice we could alternatively
enforce Equations 4 and 5 as constraints while minimizing the in-
tervention budget to determine the minimum budget required to









(𝒛)] value above the
desired threshold. The same setup can also be used to explore and
identify feasible trade-offs for the given problem at hand.
Possible Constraints. The constraints used during optimization
will similarly be situation-specific. Possible constraints include the
following.




𝑧 (𝑖) ≤ 𝑏
• A ‘do no harm’ constraint, where we only allow a difference
greater than or equal to [ (which could be zero) in expected
outcome 𝑌 before and after intervention. As with our pos-
sible objectives, this quantity could be measured within or




(𝒛)] − E[𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
] ≥ [ ∀(𝑖, 𝑘) ∈ 𝐺
for some subset 𝐺 of intervention sets and social groups. Al-

















Such a constraint can be important in the case that outcomes
for one or more groups are decreased in order to decrease
disparity between groups. See Appendix B for an example.
• A fairness constraint involving protected attribute 𝐴. Such
a constraint could be causal or associational. For a causal
example, consider a 𝜏-controlled counterfactual privilege
constraint, as defined in Kusner et al. [23], where we con-




(𝑎 (𝑖) , 𝒛)] − E[𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
(𝑎′, 𝒛)] < 𝜏, ∀𝑎′, 𝑖, 𝑘 .
• As mentioned in our discussion of objective functions, we
could enforce as a constraint that each social group rate be
above a minimum threshold ^. For example, analogous to











As with optimization objectives, the possibilities for constraints
are numerous beyond the set of examples we explore here.
B CASE STUDY DETAILS: NYC PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
To showcase the practical usefulness of our framework and high-
light the difference in methodological focus compared to that of
Kusner et al. [23], we demonstrate our approach in the same appli-
cation domain as their example: allocating funding to NYC public
schools. The original example problem imagines the US DOE in-
tervening in the NYC public school system to offer funding for
schools to hire Calculus teachers with the goal of increasing col-
lege attendance, as measured by the fraction of students taking
college entrance exams. Our adaptation of this problem uses the
same hypothetical intervention (allocating funding for schools to
hire Calculus teachers) and the same outcome to facilitate compari-
son. We can imagine the outcome—the fraction of students taking
college entrance exams—to be a proxy measure of access to higher
education. This response is not the only measure we would want
to use were we actually carrying out these interventions: whether
or not a student takes a standardized test is not a comprehensive
measure of their access to higher education, though, as in Kusner
et al. [23], it serves as a tangible example.
We will see that our disaggregated intervention design, given
its different modeling strategy and objective, is not only different
in design and required causal assumptions but can also result in
a completely different set of interventions than the 𝜏-controlled
counterfactual privilege approach of Kusner et al.. As mentioned
above, a key step in impact remediation is the measurement of
an existing disparity disaggregated across categories of interest.
This need for disaggregation means that we need to collect a new,
disaggregated dataset in order to study this problem. We collect data
for𝑚 = 490 public schools in NYC counties for the 2017-2018 school
year from publicly available National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) and Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) data releases,
and compare the impact remediation problem and discriminatory
impact problem on this new dataset. 1
Note that in this hypothetical example, our focus is not on the
causal models themselves, but instead on demonstrating the struc-
ture of impact remediation in a realistic setting. As such, we em-
phasize that the results and effectiveness of impact remediation are
sensitive to our modeling choices as well as the accuracy and fit of
each causal model, but we leave a rigorous sensitivity analysis of
impact remediation to follow-on work.
B.1 Original NYC Schools Example
To see directly how disaggregation differs from the approach of Kus-
ner et al. [23], we first introduce their original features of interest,
causal model, and optimization framework.
The original problem’s variables of interest are as follows:
• 𝑅 (𝑖) = distribution of CRDC racial/ethnic categories at school
𝑖 (set 𝑅 denotes all categories);
• 𝐹 (𝑖) = number of full-time counselors at school 𝑖 (fractional
indicates part-time);
• 𝑃 (𝑖) = if school 𝑖 offers AP or IB courses (binary);
• 𝐶 (𝑖) = if school 𝑖 offers Calculus (binary); and
• 𝑌 (𝑖) = fraction of students at school 𝑖 who take college en-
trance exams (SAT or ACT).
In the CRDC data release, the titles of the seven pre-defined
racial categories in 𝑅 (𝑖) are the following, defined in detail in con-
temporaneous NCES report de Brey et al. [6]: Black or African
1Our corresponding code repository can be found at https://github.com/lbynum/
reducing_inequality.
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Figure 3: Original causal graph structure for the NYC
schools example from [23]. This image depicts the subset of
the graph corresponding to two neighboring schools 𝑖 and 𝑗 .
American (A), Hispanic or Latino (B), White (C), Asian (D), Native
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (E), American Indian or Alaska
Native (F), Two or More Races (G). Emphasizing our modeling of
these categories as one possible partition as well as our focus on
disparity in outcomes rather than on the categories themselves, we
denote them A through G in our analysis, as lettered above.
The assumed causal model is based on the following assumptions,
with a stylized interference assumption:
• All observed variables at school 𝑖 directly influence impact
𝑌 (𝑖) ; and
• Students can take AP/IB courses or Calculus courses from
any of the nearest 𝐾 = 5 schools to the school they attend,
so 𝐶 (𝑖) and 𝑃 (𝑖) also influence 𝑌 ( 𝑗) if school 𝑗 is one of the
nearest 𝐾 schools to school 𝑖 .
The corresponding causal graph structure for a pair of neigh-
boring schools 𝑖, 𝑗 with interference is shown in Figure 3. The full
structural equations used for 𝑌 are given by:
E[𝑌 (𝑖) (𝒓, 𝒛) |𝑅 (𝑖) = 𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝑃 (𝑖) = 𝑝 (𝑖) , 𝐹 (𝑖) = 𝑓 (𝑖) ]
= 𝜶𝑇 𝒓 · max
𝑗 ∈𝑁 (𝑖)
s.t.,𝑧 ( 𝑗 ) =1
𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑗)𝐶 ( 𝑗) (𝒛)
+ 𝜷𝑇 𝒓 · max
𝑗 ∈𝑁 (𝑖)
𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑗)𝑝 ( 𝑗)
+𝜸𝑇 𝒓 𝑓 (𝑖)
+ 𝜽𝑇 𝒓
where
• 𝐶 ( 𝑗) (𝒛) = 𝑧 ( 𝑗) ;
• 𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑗) = inverse GIS distance between schools 𝑖, 𝑗 ;
• 𝑁 (𝑖) = a set of the nearest 𝐾 = 5 schools to 𝑖 and also 𝑖 itself
(a 6 element set);
• 𝒓 (𝑖) = observed proportions of racial/ethnic categories at
school 𝑖;
• 𝒓 = any counterfactual setting of racial/ethnic category pro-
portions at school 𝑖;
• 𝜶 , 𝜷,𝜸 , 𝜽 are the structural equation parameters fit via least
squares; and
• {𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝑐 (𝑖) , 𝑝 (𝑖) , 𝑓 (𝑖) , 𝑦 (𝑖) }𝑚
𝑖=1 are our observed data.
2
The purpose of the optimization in Kusner et al. [23] is to max-
imize the overall beneficial impact of an intervention, while con-
straining the estimated counterfactual benefit at school 𝑖 due to
racial discrimination. Kusner et al. measure discrimination due
to race via the notion of counterfactual privilege. In this example,
counterfactual privilege 𝑐𝑖𝑟 ′ is defined as:
𝑐𝑖𝑟 ′ = E[𝑌 (𝑖) (𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝒛) |𝑅 (𝑖) = 𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝑃 (𝑖) = 𝑝 (𝑖) , 𝐹 (𝑖) = 𝑓 (𝑖) ]
− E[𝑌 (𝑖) (𝒓 ′, 𝒛) |𝑅 (𝑖) = 𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝑃 (𝑖) = 𝑝 (𝑖) , 𝐹 (𝑖) = 𝑓 (𝑖) ]
measuring the difference between the factual benefit received by
school 𝑖 after interventions 𝒛 and the counterfactual benefit school 𝑖
would have received under the same interventions had the racial/ethnic
distribution of school 𝑖 instead been 𝒓 ′. (See Kusner et al. [23] for
the definition of 𝑐𝑖𝑟 ′ in the general case.)
Wrapping these two goals (maximizing overall beneficial impact
and constraining counterfactual privilege) into an optimization









𝑧 (𝑖) ≤ 𝑏
𝑐𝑖𝑟 ′ < 𝜏 ∀𝑟 ′ ∈ 𝑅, 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . ,𝑚},
(6)
maximizing the expected total impact𝑌 , subject to a maximum num-
ber of interventions 𝑏 and constraining counterfactual privilege to
remain below 𝜏 . We now describe the corresponding disaggregated
approach for impact remediation.
B.2 Disaggregated NYC Schools Example
In the general case, we would choose our setting for impact reme-
diation based on an existing disparity we have measured. In this
case, we have already chosen the setting of the original problem
for comparison. Despite the already chosen setting, upon gathering
data we see that there is indeed an imbalance in outcome rates
𝑌 across groups, with the following observed outcome rates for
groups A through G:
A B C D E F G
0.249 0.243 0.329 0.400 0.355 0.258 0.297
In other words, only about 25% of students are taking entrance
exams for groups A, B, and F, compared to rates as high as 40% for
students in group D.
2In slight contrast to the full structural equations in Kusner et al. [23], in our second
term involving 𝑝 ( 𝑗 ) we maximize over all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 (𝑖) regardless of whether 𝑧 ( 𝑗 ) = 1
because the intervention is specific to Calculus courses rather than all AP/IB courses.
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Figure 4: Disaggregated causal graph structure for the NYC
schools example. This image, again, depicts the subset of the
graph corresponding to twoneighboring schools 𝑖 and 𝑗 , now
with no causal variable for sensitive social attribute 𝑅 and
with the outcome 𝑌 disaggregated across social categories A,
B, and C.
Observe that, in the original example 𝑐𝑖𝑟 ′ requires a counterfac-
tual with respect to racial/ethnic distribution 𝒓 , bringing with it
some of the challenges discussed in Section 3. Having now gathered
disaggregated data directly on this disparity, we are able to take a
different approach. To be more precise, we have now measured 𝑌
in a disaggregated manner as follows:
• 𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
= fraction of students in social category 𝑘 at school 𝑖
who take college entrance exams (SAT or ACT).
Alongside this disaggregation, we no longer model the racial/ethnic
distribution 𝑅 as a causal variable. We maintain analogous assump-
tions that all observed variables at school 𝑖 directly influence each
impact 𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
, and that𝐶 (𝑖) , 𝑃 (𝑖) also influence 𝑌 ( 𝑗)
𝑘
if school 𝑗 is one
of the nearest 𝐾 = 5 neighboring schools. Our new disaggregated
causal graph structure is shown in Figure 4. To declutter the dia-
gram, we show the outcome disaggregated over only 3 groups —
A, B, and C. In actuality, there are 7 groups — A, B, C, D, E, F, and
G. In order to make the comparison as direct as possible, we keep
roughly the same functional form for our structural equations, this
time for each 𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
instead of one aggregate 𝑌 (𝑖) :
E[𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘
(𝒛) |𝑅 (𝑖) = 𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝑃 (𝑖) = 𝑝 (𝑖) , 𝐹 (𝑖) = 𝑓 (𝑖) ]
= 𝜶𝑇
𝑘








𝒓 (𝑖) · max
𝑗 ∈𝑁 (𝑖)
𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑗)𝑝 ( 𝑗)
+𝜸𝑇
𝑘




now with parameters 𝜶𝑘 , 𝜷𝑘 ,𝜸𝑘 , 𝜽𝑘 for each social category
𝑘 , again, fit via least squares. In our case, we consider the ob-
served presence of Calculus courses under the null intervention,
replacing𝐶 ( 𝑗) (𝒛) with𝐶 ( 𝑗) ∨𝐶 ( 𝑗) (𝒛), because the current presence
of courses impacts the current differences in outcomes between
groups, which are relevant to our optimization objective. Although
we have the same functional form involving 𝒓 (𝑖) , the underlying
causal assumption with respect to 𝑅 has changed — the relationship
is now purely associational, and intervention with respect to 𝑅 is
undefined. Hence, 𝑅 is no longer part of the causal graph.
We saw several potential objective functions and constraints
in Appendix A. Consider the following choice of disaggregated




































𝑧 (𝑖) ≤ 𝑏
(7)
minimizing our measure of expected disparity subject to the
same maximum number of interventions 𝑏. We also solve a second
version of this optimization problem with the following additional











(𝒛) |𝑅 (𝑖) = 𝒓 (𝑖) , 𝑃 (𝑖) = 𝑝 (𝑖) , 𝐹 (𝑖) = 𝑓 (𝑖) ]
−E[𝑌 (𝑖)
𝑘




In order to solve the optimization problems in both the original
and disaggregated approach, we use the same reformulation to a
mixed-integer linear-program (MILP) introduced in [23], with only
a slight distinction: our alternate objective function requires that
we linearize an absolute value, which is automatically handled by
the Gurobi optimization package in Python [11]. As the MILP itself
is not our focus here, we refer the reader to the specification of the
MILP in Kusner et al. [23] for details on auxiliary variables and an
MILP reformulation of the optimization problem in Equation 6 that
directly applies to our new optimization problem in Equation 7.
Solving both optimization problems with our new dataset demon-
strates how impact remediation can lead to very different policy rec-
ommendations. To capture both ends of the spectrum of solutions
for 𝜏-controlled counterfactual privilege, we solve two versions of
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Figure 5: Expected impact for each social category before and after performing the interventions recommended by each
method — from left to right: impact remediation (IR), impact remediation with an additional no-harm constraint (IR + ‘no
harm’), the discriminatory impact problem with 𝜏 = 0.567 (DIP), and the discriminatory impact problem with 𝜏-controlled
counterfactual privilege unconstrained (DIP Unconstrained).
Figure 6: Comparison of which 100 schools are chosen by
impact remediation using two different social partitions of
the same population. On the left, we partition the popula-
tion based on seven CRDC racial/ethnic categories. On the
right, we partition the population based on the Cartesian
product of sevenCRDC racial/ethnic categories and two gen-
der categories, or 14 groups overall. Schools selected in both
problems are indicated by blue dots. Those unique to each
problem are indicated by red plus symbols.
Figure 7: Comparison of the different gender and racial dis-
tributions across schools chosen by two impact remediation
settings, each using a different social partition of the same
population. Students tabulated for each social partition are
those unique to each impact remediation setting i.e., stu-
dents corresponding to the red plus symbols in Figure 6.
the original discriminatory impact problem, one with 𝜏 = 0.567 —
found to be the smallest feasible value of 𝜏 to three decimal places —
and another with infinite 𝜏 (i.e., unconstrained 𝑐𝑖𝑟 ′ ). We solve both
the discriminatory impact problem (DIP) and impact remediation
(IR) with a budget of 𝑏 = 100 out of the 490 schools.
Figure 5 shows, for each method, the expected impact in each
group with the optimal intervention compared to the null-intervention.
Expected impact under the null-intervention is computed using the
observed presence of Calculus courses𝐶 (𝑖) while allowing interfer-
ence. We see gains for many groups in both versions of DIP. In reg-
ular IR, we see at least one group’s expected impact values decrease
rather than increase, a trend remedied by adding the ‘no harm’ con-
straint. Taking a closer look, Table 1 shows our measure of expected
disparity for each set of interventions, along with the percentage








𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵,𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸, 𝐹,𝐺}, and the percentage change in aggregate










see that, with no intervention at all, the expected disparity measure
is 1.429. Regular IR is able to lower this value the most, to 1.386,
but we observe that this has come at the cost of lower outcome
rates for group G. Including the ‘no harm’ constraint avoids this
issue, leading to even larger increases for groups that previously
saw gains from regular IR, and we still see a decrease in overall
disparity. Notice that our disaggregated approach in IR can more
directly reveal when the effect of a possible intervention is not uni-
versally positive and may cause harm for some sub-population(s),
though a full understanding of this possibility would require a full
analysis of the causal model fit and coefficients. The last two rows
of the table show that, in both instances of DIP, although the ag-
gregate impact is the highest (which is the objective of DIP), the
groups that need the least help, with the exception of group B, see
their largest gains in impact, while most of the groups with lower
outcome rates see smaller gains. The 𝜏-controlled counterfactual
privilege constraint has dampened this effect slightly, but has had
little effect on disparity — in both cases, disparity has increased
compared to performing no interventions.
In summary, our proposed framework, IR, with the no harm
option, is in this case most effective at reducing disparities where it
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matters most — prioritizing groups with lower measured outcomes
(such as A and F) and decreasing disparity overall.
Although our example here is stylized compared to a full real-
world application problem, it demonstrates how the impact reme-
diation framework’s focus on disparity rather than on utility as
an objective can lead it to very different policy recommendations.
Observe also that our decision problem depends directly on what
partition of the population we consider disparity across. Figure 6
shows visually how different an allocation of optimal schools can
be for impact remediation if we consider racial/ethnic categories
only, versus considering the intersection of both racial/ethnic cate-
gories and gender categories. Considering the intersection of these
categories has significantly changed which schools are chosen for
additional funding. Figure 7 shows the corresponding distributions
across gender and racial/ethnic categories for the schools unique
to each version of impact remediation. Including gender in our
social partition (indicated with stripes) has altered both of these
distributions — across gender and across racial/ethnic groups. For
example, in the racial/ethnic distribution, the fractions of group A
have shifted noticeably. Impact remediation including gender also
targets a larger fraction of students in the Female group.
In summary, our results demonstrate how the policy recom-
mendations of impact remediation will depend not only on our
chosen measure of disparity or optimization constraints, but also
on which groups we consider.
